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he Doha trade round has reached 
a critical stage, after five years 
of stop-start negotiations. Many 
are pessimistic and feel that the 
international mood is insufficiently 
engaged to bring success. Nevertheless, 
a deal may in fact be closer than some 
might imagine, especially if sufficient 
political will can be generated at the 
ongoing WTO negotiations in Geneva 
and the forthcoming G8 summit in St 
Petersburg. 
The Doha Development Agenda (DDA) 
negotiations are the first global trade 
talks to treat development issues as a 
priority. After the failure of the previous 
Millennium round amid riots and 
mayhem at Seattle in 1999, the big 
‘Quad countries’ (US, EU, Japan and 
Canada) recognised that progress in 
global trade could only continue if those 
in developing countries believe that free 
trade reform will benefit them.  
The trade round almost failed at Cancún 
in September 2003 but new EU and US 
positions on export farm subsidies last 
year enabled progress to resume.  
It took until July 2004, following 
intensive negotiations, for WTO 
members to accept proposals to cut the 
subsidies richer countries give their 
farmers for exports. In a breakthrough 
at the Geneva meeting, the key nations 
including the US, the EU, Brazil and 
Japan, agreed to eliminate the 
problematic export subsidies, to limit 
other subsidies and to lower tariff 
barriers.  
Developing countries also won the right 
to protect ‘special’ products crucial to 
the well-being of their economies. 
Meanwhile, the more controversial 
aspects of competition and investment 
were quietly dropped after Cancún. 
 
The DDA negotiations resumed 
cautious progress at the Hong Kong 
ministerial in December 2005, but 
progress has been slow and many 
consider there is now a real risk of 
failure.  
A brief summary of the obstacles 
currently facing negotiators would 
include: 
•  the EU needs to be persuaded to 
make bigger tariff cuts in 
agriculture;  
•  the US needs to accept bigger cuts 
in domestic agricultural subsidies; 
and 
•  the developing countries (Brazil, 
India, China and South Africa) need 
to move purposefully towards the 
removal of import barriers by 
cutting tariffs on industrial 
products. 
Once these obstacles have been 
overcome, negotiators could then make 
the necessary additional progress in 
services and rules before the end of this 
year. 
If parties to the negotiations can keep a 
sense of the wider economic prize to be 
achieved by an agreement, a 
satisfactory outcome for the round can 
still be achieved. Yet agreement must 
be reached across all areas of the 
negotiations, so it is important that 
participants are urged to make 
concessions in often-sensitive areas in 
order to reap offsetting gains in the 
areas in which they may have an 
advantage.  
Progress since Hong Kong 
Considerable differences still remain 
between the EU and the US in domestic 
support to agriculture, and between the 
developed and developing world in 
liberalising ‘southern’ goods markets. 
However, the pendulum of blame is 
now beginning to swing back from the 
EU to the US position, especially in 
agriculture, as the key obstacle to the 
round.  
At least now, however, with the 
publication of the draft text on 
agriculture by Crawford Falconer, the 
chair of the WTO’s agriculture 
committee, on June 22, the key 
modalities (a tiered formula) to be used 
are now spelt out. And while very 
substantial gaps remain in the text to be 
agreed between the parties, it is at least 
now clear where these divergences are, 
so that remedial work can be focused 
upon them in the coming weeks.  
The  EU’s present offer continues to 
consist of cutting farm tariffs by an 
average of around 39% and exempting 
8% of its tariff lines as ‘sensitive 
products’. On domestic farm support, 
the EU is presently committed to cuts in 
domestic subsidies of 70% on items 
believed to be trade distorting, while 
also offering a 60% cut in agricultural 
tariffs. Meanwhile, the US has been 
asking the EU for an 83% cut in 
domestic farm support, taking into 
account the higher base of domestic 
subsidy in the EU.  
In return, the US proposals now offer a 
60% reduction in their domestic farm 
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support for trade-distorting payments 
and are offering a 90% cut in tariffs. 
However, achieving this reduction in 
domestic support will still require 
significant reform of the US Farm Bill 
due in 2007, while the EU proposals are 
made on the basis of an actual CAP 
reform package already achieved in 
2003.  
Finally, a major positive element in the 
negotiations should be the fact that both 
the US and the EU agreed in Hong 
Kong to eliminate export subsidies by 
2013, as an absolute date.  
Under normal circumstances, these 
positions are far from irreconcilable, 
and indeed the concessions presently on 
offer by the US/EU (especially on 
eliminating export subsidies) would 
have been unimaginable two or three 
years ago. Nevertheless, opinions 
remained divided as to whether a 
successful outcome can be achieved at 
the technical level, and especially on the 
desire for a deal at the highest political 
levels.  
Some see the recent move of US trade 
representative Robert Portman to the 
US Treasury as an indicator of the low 
priority the US administration assigns to 
trade, while others insist that under 
Susan Schwab, the replacement for 
Ambassador Portman as USTR, the US 
remains both willing and able both to 
deliver the necessary leadership to 
achieve a meaningful trade deal next 
year, and to encourage developing 
countries to make their own reforms in 
return.  
There is little doubt that any ‘crisis of 
confidence’ can still be overcome, but 
only given political will at the highest 
level.  
The reluctant EU member states can 
still be ‘brought round’ in order to 
enable EU Commissioner Peter 
Mandelson to offer the bigger cuts in 
farm tariffs required to bring the broad 
outlines of a meaningful deal into view 
by the end of this summer. However, 
the EU institutions may be reluctant to 
support the Commission in making 
further agricultural concessions 
(especially on domestic support) 
without being clear that the US 
negotiation mandate in agriculture will 
actually require a major reform of the 
US Farm Bill.  
Problems remain in 
agriculture 
In large part the uncertainty here arises 
from the complexity of the various 
formulae and in particular the 
elasticities used when applying them.  
But many, especially NGOs, now 
consider the US (or its agricultural 
lobby’s) desire to match any 
concessions in domestic support with 
one-for-one gains in fresh market access 
for US exports as a core obstacle for the 
round.  
And signs are emerging of greater 
realism in the agricultural debates in 
Europe. The reality of any successful 
Doha round, for both the US and the 
EU, must mean that US world export-
market shares will continue to fall in 
some sectors, such as poultry and beef, 
while remaining competitive in other 
sectors, such as cereals. The EU 
meanwhile is likely to remain 
competitive only in medium-quality 
wheat, grain-fed beef and specialist, 
high value-added products.  
The core technical issue in agriculture 
remains the fact that the US now has 
more tariff-distorting domestic support, 
arising from the US reliance on counter-
cyclical payments (CCPs), than the EU. 
These CCPs are often not included in 
influential OECD calculations of PSEs 
(producer support equivalents) but 
nevertheless may still require an 
equivalent degree of domestic US farm 
reform (moving these counter-cyclical 
payments towards the green box) to that 
of the EU’s 2003 CAP reform, if fresh 
additional concessions from the EU are 
to be forthcoming (our interpretation). 
Outside the agricultural detail, it is to be 
hoped that the US negotiators (and farm 
lobby) can better appreciate the 
triangular aspects of the overall 
negotiations. This is simply to argue 
that any net losses (both for the US and 
EU) in agriculture can be offset by 
commensurate net gains in the other 
two areas of goods and services, in the 
context of an overall trade deal 
designed to benefit all parties. 
Indeed, evidence is now emerging that 
the US proposals in agriculture may not 
entail as significant a reform of the US 
Farm Bill, as for example was 
undertaken in the 2003 EU CAP reform. 
A new economic simulation of the US 
agriculture proposal (see IATP, 2006) 
appears to confirm what some in the 
EU, but especially NGOs and 
developing countries, have long 
suspected: the US proposals may 
actually increase the allowable amount 
of domestic agriculture spending in the 
US. 
Hence, it would appear that the US 
Trade Representative is caught between 
the lobbying of US agribusiness 
exporting companies on the one hand, 
which want more market access 
(especially to emerging markets in 
developing countries), and domestic 
commodity groups on the other, which 
want to maintain high domestic support 
payments and are sceptical that greater 
market access will benefit them.
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This may help to explain the 
constrained position that US negotiators 
find themselves in as the Doha Round 
moves forward. More worryingly still, 
the IATP report asserts that the US 
proposal fails even to go as far as the 
2004 July Framework in acknowledging 
the need for effective special and 
differential measures for developing 
countries. 
Meanwhile, efforts by the EU to 
organise a ‘stocktaking meeting’ in late 
June for select trade ministers on the 
DDA services negotiations may allow 
the parties to better grasp the essential 
3-way or ‘triangular’ trade-offs between 
the agriculture concessions, those in 
goods (non-agriculture market access) 
and progress in services.  
The intended message of course being 
that any revised ‘big country’ offer in 
agriculture must be reciprocated by 
reciprocal moves by developing 
countries in goods and services, 
focusing minds on the triangular 
linkages between market access in all 
three areas.  
The gains under Doha 
A timely reminder of the economic 
benefits comes in a recent OECD paper 
(see Ash & Tangermann, 2006), filling 
a vacuum in recent relevant research 
that underscores the likely DDA gains 
from the halving of (present levels of) 
trade protection and domestic support 
across all sectors. 
                                                 
1 This political division was not evident at the 
time of the Uruguay Round, when the larger 
commodity groups allied more closely with 
agribusiness. Closing a deal on Doha: Closer than we might think? | 3 
An interesting feature of the paper is the 
finding that agriculture remains a 
pivotal source of gains. The potential 
prize calculated from Doha is a welfare 
gain of $44 billion globally, with most 
of these gains arising from agricultural 
reform, of most relevance to LDCs, and 
most of these agricultural gains come 
from basic reform of market access 
measures.  
Table 1 below presents recent OECD 
(Ash & Tangermann, 2006) and other 
results showing a wide range of 
estimates of the potential global welfare 
gains from trade liberalisation reported 
in some earlier studies. The estimates 
obtained in the present analysis are 
towards the lower end of the range of 
estimated results obtained in previous 
analyses. This is especially evident in 
comparing the estimated $24 billion of 
welfare gains from agricultural 
liberalisation estimated in the present 
study with the estimated $193 billion 
(static) reported in an earlier study by 
the World Bank. 
Nevertheless, the question of whether 
individual developing countries or 
regions lose out from OECD 
agricultural policy reform – labelled 
‘dangerous nonsense’ by Bhagwati 
(2005a) with support from Panaghariya 
(2004) – can now be addressed. 
Generally speaking, the evidence 
suggests that developing-country 
farmers would benefit from a reduction 
of OECD agricultural trade protection 
and domestic support, although some 
could lose out in relative terms through 
preference erosion. 
Nevertheless, the same increases in 
world market prices that benefit 
developing-country farmers will reduce 
the benefits for developing-country 
consumers. 
Although the argument that rich country 
reform will hurt poor countries cannot 
be substantiated, the OECD study does 
confirm that most of the estimated 
benefits from OECD reform of 
agricultural policies (over 90%) go to 
OECD countries themselves.  
This merely confirms the accepted 
wisdom that progress in trade should 
occur unilaterally and remind us of the 
benefits of the WTO and the 
multilateral system, which underpin the 
‘received wisdom’ on trade.  
Nevertheless, at $44 billion, the OECD 
study’s estimated welfare gains – 
although less than in earlier studies – 
remain highly significant.  
Other key findings from the modelling 
are:  
•  Benefits from multi-sector reform 
are higher for non-OECD than for 
OECD countries. 
•  About 50% of global gains come 
from OECD agricultural reform. 
•  Reductions in OECD agricultural 
tariffs account for more than three-
quarters of these (gains from 
agricultural reform). 
•  Developing countries generally gain 
more from OECD reform than from 
their own reforms (in both 
agriculture and non-agriculture). 
•  Over 75% of global gains from 
agricultural policy reform come 
from cutting import tariffs. 
•  Nevertheless, developing countries 
gain substantially more from 
opening their markets to OECD 
industrial goods than from OECD 
agricultural reform. 
These findings mean that LDCs stand to 
gain from a balanced WTO package – 
and not one focused primarily on 
agriculture. Hence, if most participants 
can now coalesce around agreement that 
a deal is broadly speaking worthwhile, 
then we turn to the politics, and it must 
almost certainly be done before mid-
2007, when the US administration’s 
fast-track authority’ expires.  
If the issue ultimately becomes a matter 
of political will, a chance should arise at 
the highest levels to resolve matters in 
and around the leaders of the Group of 
Eight (G8) meeting, at St Petersburg in 
early July.  
Recent remarks made by President Bush 
on a visit to Europe indicate that he may 
now be engaged in the process and, 
given his weak domestic standing, 
willing to inject sufficient personal 
authority behind the talks to achieve a 
much-needed success story on the 
international policy stage. 
 
Table 1. Results obtained in OECD & other studies of trade liberalisation 
  Liberalisation scenario  Global welfare gains ($ billion) 
   Agriculture  Other  Total 
Ash & Tangermann (2006)  50% cut in domestic agricultural support 
50% cut in applied tariffs – all sectors, all regions 
26 18  44 
Anderson et al. (2005)  Elimination of domestic agricultural support and trade protection in all 
sectors 
173 105  278 
Beghin et al. (2002)  Elimination of agricultural support and protection in high-income 
OECD countries 
108 n/a  n/a 
François et al. (2003)  Elimination of tariffs, all sectors, all regions  109  107  367* 
Hertel & Keeney (2005)  Elimination of domestic agricultural support and tariffs – all sectors, 
all regions 
56 28  84 
OECD (2003)  Elimination of trade protection, all sectors  34  63  174** 
Tobarick (2005)  Elimination of domestic agricultural support and trade protection  20  n/a  n/a 
UNCTAD (2003)  50% cut in applied agricultural support and tariffs, all sectors  31  n/a  n/a 
USDA (2001)  Elimination of domestic agricultural support and tariffs, all sectors  56  n/a  n/a 
World Bank (2003)  Near 100% reduction in domestic agricultural support and applied 
tariffs 
193 98  291 
* Includes gains from services liberalisation. 
** Includes gains from trade facilitation. 
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Pro-development issues 
In the eyes of many observers, the 
success of the Uruguay round created a 
perverse situation in which poor 
countries were asked to shoulder costly 
commitments but were not supplied 
with the political or institutional means 
to do so.  
Developing countries have long 
criticised the WTO for its perceived 
procedural bias in favour of the 
industrialised nations. At the 1999 
Seattle Ministerial Conference, several 
groups of developing countries released 
statements criticising their exclusion 
from key decision-making processes at 
the WTO. Ministers from African, Latin 
American and Caribbean nations, for 
example, complained that they were not 
allowed to participate in ‘green rooms’ 
or the informal negotiating groups 
where sensitive issues were being 
discussed.  
During the Uruguay Round, WTO 
members assumed a broad set of new 
commitments, ranging from the 
enforcement of intellectual property 
rights to customs policy reform.  
At Doha, member governments took a 
series of measures to address these 
development issues, establishing a 
working group on trade, debt and 
finance and issued declarations on the 
problems of small economies, least-
developed countries and technical 
cooperation. The Ministerial 
Declaration also incorporated special 
and differential treatment and capacity-
building clauses into most of the major 
issue areas, reflecting developing 
country concerns as to the technical and 
administrative burdens associated with 
preparing for comprehensive and 
lengthy trade negotiations.  
Do these various technical measures, 
however, and the increased size of the 
WTO, mean that the mandate and 
composition of the WTO now reflect 
increased awareness of the needs of 
developing countries? A core question 
facing the multilateral process today is 
whether this re-balancing can lead to a 
more viable WTO – or whether 
expansion and overload may lead to its 
gradual paralysis.  
Trade not aid? 
With the notable exception of China, 
the global momentum in favour of more 
markets and less government 
intervention has slowed down 
considerably. The climate of ideas has 
changed since the heyday of the 
Washington Consensus only a decade 
ago. There is less enthusiasm for trade 
liberalisation in the developing world 
and there is greater all-round 
enthusiasm for aid (see Erixon & Sally, 
2006). 
Broadly speaking, the critics are making 
three arguments. First, there are weak 
links between trade liberalisation, 
growth and poverty reduction. A 
stronger version holds that trade 
liberalisation damages developing 
countries and makes the poor poorer. 
Second, developed countries should 
liberalise trade, but developing 
countries should not. And third, 
developing countries should use 
interventionist industrial policies to 
promote infant industries. This requires 
more flexible WTO rules. 
However, these arguments can be 
countered with the evidence. In-depth 
country studies going back to the 1970s 
and 1980s – and more recent (although 
less dependable) studies using cross-
country regression analysis – strongly 
suggest that countries with more liberal 
trade policies have more open 
economies and grow faster than those 
with more protectionist policies (Erixon 
& Sally, 2006).  
According to World Bank and OECD 
figures, since 1980 developing countries 
with a total population of about three 
billion – mostly in Asia – have more 
than doubled their trade-to-gross 
domestic product (GDP) ratios, doubled 
real per capita incomes and have cut 
average import tariffs by more than 
one-third.  
Even the recently downward revisions 
in World Bank estimates of future trade 
liberalisation effects are far from being 
insignificant. If long-run productivity 
gains were added, welfare gains to 
developing countries from full 
liberalisation of merchandise trade 
would rise to $200 billion per annum 
and about 127 million people – more 
than 10% of the world’s very poor – 
would be lifted out of extreme poverty.  
Naturally, much greater gains would 
result from radical liberalisation of 
developing-country services markets 
and from all-round opening of labour 
markets to workers from developing 
countries. 
Of course, as Erixon and Sally point 
out, trade liberalisation on its own is of 
course no panacea. To fully capture 
productivity gains, external 
liberalisation must be part of broader 
market-based and institutional reforms 
– but the central point remains that the 
more prosperous developing countries 
are those that have liberalised external 
trade and foreign direct investment. 
The high price of failure 
We have advanced the case that many 
of the various ingredients of a 
successful outcome are closer to being 
in place than many might think. As we 
reach the crucial make or break point 
for the DDA in the next few months, 
and crucial political engagement is 
required, we now feel that it is also 
important to draw attention to what 
would be lost by the failure of the 
round. 
Our concern is to avoid the damage that 
would be inflicted on the global 
commercial system by a serious blow to 
the credibility and institutional authority 
of the WTO. 
While high ambitions remain, there is 
now a serious risk that time is running 
out, and the question can be asked 
whether the seriousness of what would 
be risked is fully comprehended by all 
parties.  
National governments, international 
stakeholders and not least the EC 
institutions should be in no doubt that 
European business is extremely 
concerned at the prospect, and likely 
consequences, of failure.  
A healthy, functioning WTO not only 
remains essential, but is more desirable 
now than ever. The WTO is the sole 
multilateral institution capable of 
driving forward the general process of 
trade and investment liberalisation. For 
this function to fail now would be to 
deprive the much larger numbers of the 
world’s citizens presently excluded 
from wealth from benefiting from the 
full potential of global commercial 
opportunities. 
The Doha round seeks to add the 
necessary development dimension 
needed to bring the benefits enjoyed by 
the developed world to the wider LDC Closing a deal on Doha: Closer than we might think? | 5 
community as yet unable to take 
advantage of them. 
Simply put, these potential gains are far 
too important to be thrown away lightly, 
especially as a consequence of short-
sighted negotiating positions or ‘UN-
style’ posturing, which are often based, 
it must be said, on less-than-solid 
analytical foundations. Such an 
outcome has been described as ‘a 
tragedy’ by a distinguished former 
Director-General of the WTO (see 
Sutherland & Ollila, 2006). 
It would be a terrible irony if the sheer 
size of today’s WTO – which, at 149 
members, is surely a sign of success – 
leads to its collapse. An unfortunate by-
product of its present size has been a 
deterioration in the quality of the 
internal debate. Described as ‘UN-
isation’, this has often resulted in 
excessive posturing and rhetorical 
public discourse – at the expense of 
genuine, measured internal discussion 
within WTO meetings. 
 The DDA has now had many false 
deadlines, but the present one seems 
real enough. Hence, even now at the 
‘11
th hour’, negotiators and stakeholders 
must attempt to bestir themselves to 
imagine what will be lost if the DDA 
fails irretrievably, to focus on the big 
picture that can truly strengthen their 
economies by promoting change, and 
favouring enterprises that have a future 
– not protecting special interests from 
the past. 
The alternative to a deal is 
not the status quo?  
It is crucial to understand that the 
alternative to Doha is not the status quo 
but rather a changed and weakened 
world trading order. First, failure would 
lead to an acceleration of bilateral trade 
deals … as an alternative route to free 
trade at the multilateral level. 
This tendency is already becoming 
evident even in EU thinking (with EU-
Korea, EU-India now being openly 
talked about).  
Further, a failure of the DDA would 
bring into question the size and modus 
operandi of the present WTO – until 
such matters were resolved, possibly 
taking several years – the prospects for 
a further successful round would not be 
encouraging.  
The interim vacuum that this would 
create would mean the rapid 
proliferation of regional and bilateral 
deals,
2 which could:  
•  seriously damage the trading and 
investment environment, 
•  undermine the WTO’s central 
institutional mechanisms, especially 
the DSM, & most perversely 
•  create more interference in ‘beyond 
the border’ governance than would 
a multilateral agreement. 
Hence, the very credibility of the 
multilateral trading system is at stake. 
The GATT & WTO have helped to 
deliver much of our collective 
prosperity enjoyed over nearly 60 years. 
WTO remains the best basis for 
bringing new prosperity to the 
developing world, which has so far not 
fully participated in international trade 
(especially South-South) 
Finally, there will be considerable costs 
from rules and regulations, especially 
compliance with rules or origin, 
resulting in a ‘spaghetti bowl’ of 
complex, costly and discriminatory 
trade agreements. 
There can be little doubt that all these 
effects will act as strong disincentives, 
and the depressive effect this can have 
on trade in a presently somewhat 
divided world order are almost certain 
to be severe.  
Overall, such developments that would 
weaken the WTO can only be viewed as 
perverse, coming at a time when LDC 
enterprises – and citizens – should 
expect to have available to them all the 
opportunities (and institutions) that 
have so greatly benefited business in the 
industrially advanced countries in the 
past 50 years. 
The WTO as a public good  
Moreover, untold damage would be 
inflicted on the WTO as a multilateral 
institution and therefore arbiter and 
guarantor of global good governance. In 
the absence of a world level of 
government, the multiple states in the 
world come closest to achieving this 
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when they pool sovereignty by signing 
an internationally binding agreement, 
such as the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Flora and Fauna (Cites), the Kyoto 
Protocol or the international whaling 
convention (ICW). While as an 
institution the WTO is more akin to a 
club in legal terms, its functional 
purpose nevertheless operates to bind 
the multiple parties – providing 
something that individual countries 
acting alone cannot provide. 
The WTO in this sense meets the classic 
‘public good’ criteria of a service that, 
once provided to one user, must be 
provided in the same amount to all users 
due to its non-rival and non-excludable 
nature.
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From this perspective, it seems almost 
incredible that the world community – 
often advised by sectional interests that 
are certainly un-representative (of LDC 
citizens) and arguably even myopic in 
their pursuit of an ill-defined single 
issue – appears to be almost 
sleepwalking into this institutional and 
governance minefield. 
Few can argue against the well-targeted, 
and often-cogent criticisms of the 
development failures of the 
international financial institutions (cf 
Joseph Stiglitz). Nevertheless, when an 
appreciation of these occasional failures 
widens out into a systematic and 
totemic antipathy to open economics in 
almost all of it guises, it is questionable 
whether this has not become a 
dysfunctional dialogue (‘a dialogue of 
the deaf’).  
It is also something to which the 
mainstream policy community seems 
ill-organised to counter effectively. 
Nevertheless there are signs that the 
anti-globalisation movement may have 
reached its high-water mark. It is to be 
hoped that in the face of well-argued 
counter criticisms (see Erixon, 2005), 
the solid case for free trade (most 
especially when compared to the 
limitations of aid policy) can shortly 
give way to more serious debate.  
There are even signs from the DDA 
negotiations that this is now happening. 
We argue that when the more emotive 
aspects are stripped away, the 
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conventional wisdom on trade still has 
the bulk of the arguments in its favour. 
In short, there are many things wrong 
with the world – but free trade is not 
one of them. 
Other serious risks ...?  
Other serious problems are not hard to 
discern. First, there is the response of 
countries that are on the point of joining 
the WTO – for example, Russia, 
Vietnam (or even Bosnia or Lebanon, 
nearer to home) – to a Doha failure: 
•  it is always a struggle to gain 
domestic political consent to the 
demanding conditions of WTO 
entry. 
•  if this support is to be maintained, 
the institution must remain credible.  
•  a great benefit of accession is the 
right to participate fully in future 
multilateral trade negotiations. 
•  this prospect must be safeguarded. 
Second, we must consider what signal 
would be sent out to new WTO entrants 
such as China (or Russia or Saudi 
Arabia). 
European business leaders need to state 
clearly that they see the DDA as an 
enormous market opportunity and an 
engine of future global economic 
growth. We need to know that the 
emergence of countries in Asia, and in 
particular incomplete market economies 
such as China are subject to credible 
and enforceable rules. 
For in reality, there are no other rules 
governing international trade than those 
of the WTO. If WTO rules are 
diminished by the political impact of a 
failed Doha round, then the whole 
international system of commerce will 
suffer, including LDCs. 
The outlines of a deal? 
We consider that we are in fact close to 
a deal if the US can be persuaded to 
scale back its ambitions in certain 
sectors, for the sake of achieving broad 
agreement. Hence a last ‘big-push’ 
could wrap up a deal in time to avoid 
the expiry of the US President’s fast-
track trade-negotiating authority in mid-
2007. Of course, it will be only seen in 
the coming weeks whether the political 
will is there to enable the negotiators to 
bring this together. 
First, in the area of agriculture, it should 
be acknowledged that long-standing and 
widespread condemnation of rich-
country subsidies ‘running at $1 billion 
a day’ and causing ‘massive 
overproduction’ are really just 
exaggerations that make the task of 
reducing subsidies seem politically 
intractable. 
According to Jagdish Bhagwati (2005b) 
of Columbia University, when one 
omits the subsidies that are ‘decoupled’ 
from production and trade, the 
‘coupled’ subsidies that distort 
production and trade are less than $100 
billion (€85 billion); and here too the 
export subsidies are ‘only’ in the range 
of $3-5 billion annually. 
Clearly, these export subsidies are now 
small enough to be negotiated away and 
some effort could surely then be made 
to tackle the ‘coupled’ subsidies. The 
hope is that Mr Mandelson can get 
permission to offer further cuts in EU 
tariffs and quotas (‘market access’ in 
the negotiations) in return for further 
reciprocal concessions in the final deal. 
In the main, the EU has little 
comparative advantage in agriculture, 
so the reciprocity it needs has to come 
in the other negotiating ‘zones’ of 
manufactures and services (the 
triangular argument, see above). 
We must remember, however, that the 
Group of 20, which includes the bigger 
developing countries such as India and 
Brazil, still have tariffs on manufactures 
that are significantly higher than the 
OECD average. Cuts in these can surely 
be put on the table. Brazil has already 
indicated a willingness to do so, and it 
is to be hoped that India is likely to 
follow. 
As we have seen, however, the US has a 
comparative advantage in some aspects 
of agriculture, so it cannot entirely 
ignore the demands of US farmers for 
‘sectoral reciprocity’ from the large 
(e.g. Cairns group) agricultural 
producers such as Brazil and Mexico, 
which also have high tariff barriers on 
agriculture. So the Cairns group should 
be willing to support a deal that cuts its 
members’ agricultural trade barriers in 
return for long-desired market access to 
the US. 
Turning to services, the main 
commercial interest in the US and the 
EU comes from the insurance and 
banking sectors. These services, 
however, actually lubricate trade, and 
the developing countries can surely be 
persuaded to take more quantitative 
commitments here, providing the EU 
and the US with additional quid pro quo 
for their agricultural concessions. The 
poorest countries must also be brought 
on board, although some hesitate to 
liberalise trade for fear they may lose 
tariff revenues on which they rely for 
public spending. 
Other small LDCs are afraid to embrace 
liberalisation because they lack 
adjustment assistance programmes to 
help workers made redundant by import 
competition. Other countries enjoy 
existing preferences and fear ‘most 
favoured nation’ tariff liberalisation 
under the Doha round would erode their 
value.  
For many of these problems, the new 
‘aid for trade’ programme endorsed at 
Hong Kong can provide aid funds to 
respond to these tasks. The WTO and 
its supporters must hope that this 
positive step can bring many of the 
least-developed countries on board for 
Doha. The Director-General (Pascal 
Lamy) has been asked to consult with 
the IMF, World Bank and other relevant 
international organisations on 
appropriate mechanisms to secure 
additional financial resources for Aid 
for Trade through grants and ‘soft’ 
(concessional) loans. 
Hence, in technical terms, the outlines 
of a deal that would close the Doha 
round are now more-or-less clear. It 
remains for the WTO Director-General 
to present them forcefully (in the 
tradition of the ‘Dunkel draft’, which 
rescued the Uruguay round of talks) and 
to get the member states to follow up 
with an extraordinary meeting within 
six months, the penultimate step to 
finalising a deal by the end of 2006 and 
its approval by early 2007. As Prof. 
Bhagwati has written, “it can be done, it 
is up to us all to do it”. Closing a deal on Doha: Closer than we might think? | 7 
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